Value of Safe Seat Primaries?
By Fester:
Two years ago, in April 2006, I projected a Democratic House caucus in which I that it would be an effective governing majority. This week's losses on FISA capitulation and the ineffectiveness of following up on Scott McClellan testimony concerning the highly probable systemic obstruction of justice in the Plame case reinforce that basic point. I had laid out a decision checklist on backing aggressive primary challengers for 2008 in order to seek better Democrats or at the very least more pliable from a progressive angle Democrats. I think the three major primary challengers to Democratic incumbents that netroots activists funded met my criteria. However these challengers have not appreciably changed the incentive structure for Democratic Congresscritters and I am curious if one element of my decision matrix is wrong:
Does the incumbent come from a safe district with a high Democratic PVI advantage?
I am questioning the value of restricting the challenge list to safe seat Democrats. Chris Bowers has the revised and expanded Bush Dog list of Democrats who voted for FISA immunity, amnesia and repeal of significant elements of the Church reforms as well as voting to fund Iraq with no strings attached. These Democrats come from districts that range from R+18 to D+17. The traditional techniques would be focused on the highly Democratic districts on the theory that losing any seat would be unacceptable and areas such as Prince George County, Maryland will not elect a Republican no matter what. This system gives a pass to swing and tough seat Democrats. Unfortunately that is enough seats to allow for very bad laws to go through while our intelligence is insulted. It has not worked in changing the incentive structure of tough votes.
In 2006 we did not know if the Democratic House leadership would run the House under the majority of the majority system or the majority of the whole system. Majority of the whole greatly favors conservative Democrats as they can credibly threaten to defect on any deal and create a second option with the Republican caucus. We have seen this conservative governing coalition dominate the Iraq war debate. Giving conservative Democrats from tough seats a pass enables Republican favored policies to pass the House. We need to rethink this.
High Republican PVI districts that are represented by Democrats, especially newer Democrats who do not have long standing relationships to the area require a Democratic incumbent to line all of their ducks in a row and hope the GOP is locally screwed if they are to be re-elected. This means the liberals within the representative's winning coalition must be willing to work their tails off for a candidate who will routinely screw them over at the local and national level.
If we assume that all office holders base their votes on some calculus of personal principal/policy preferences and political calculation, liberal/progressive netroots activists can change the formulation of the political calculation so that soft principal votes become more calculation votes in order to maintain the liberal wing of the electoral coalition.
Assuming Democrats pick up double digit House seats this fall to improve the cushion, the threat of losing one to five R+10 or worse seats because of liberal opposition may be a worthwhile trade-off. As a defensive action, electing and enabling conservative Democrats was a necessary first step but it is an insufficient step to changing the political calculus and trends within American politics. It is time to find better leaders either through new candidates supported by new nodes of power, or by changing the existing political power matrix. And challenging conservative Democrats in conservative seats from the left will force change even at, or more truthfully, because of the highly probable net loss of seats that this type of action would force.














