An American surge means an Al-Qaeda surge

By Gregg Carlstrom

Leah Farrell, the editor of the excellent All Things Counterterrorism blog, has an op-ed in The Australian looking at Al-Qaeda and the Obama administration's proposed Afghan strategy.

The whole thing is worth a read, but to summarize Farrell's point: Al-Qaeda wants the U.S. to increase its military presence in Afghanistan, because Al-Qaeda values Afghanistan primarily as a battleground for jihad. The "safe havens" argument is misleading, she writes, because Al-Qaeda already has a safe haven across the Durand Line in Pakistan, and because the jihad in Afghanistan is Al-Qaeda's most useful propaganda tool.

In other words: If Obama is serious about his plan to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda," he's pursuing exactly the wrong approach. The more troops he sends to Afghanistan, the more recruits Al-Qaeda will attract.

A withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan would undoubtedly hand al-Qa'ida and the Taliban a propaganda victory. However, a victory would deny al-Qa'ida its most potent source of power, influence, funding and recruits -- the armed jihad.

I attended a panel discussion at the Carnegie Endowment a couple of weeks ago, and on the way out I picked up an old Afghanistan policy brief by Gilles Dorronsoro (it was published in January). I read it on an airplane this weekend, and I'm struck by the parallels between Dorronsaro's argument and Farrell's.

Dorronsaro wants the U.S. to begin a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, not a buildup. The paper -- PDF version here -- argues that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is the main factor behind the Taliban's resurgence.

Historically, the more military pressure is put on a fragmented society like Afghanistan, the more a coalition against the invader becomes the likely outcome. This is what happened in the 1980s with the Soviet occupation and against the British in the nineteenth century.

[...] Withdrawal would create a new dynamic in the country, providing two main benefits. The momentum of the Taliban would slow or stop altogether, because without a foreign occupier the Jihadist and nationalist feelings of the population would be much more difficult to mobilize...

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have different goals, of course. The Taliban is positioning itself as a national resistance movement; it wants to retake Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has no interest in running the country. But both groups would be energized by a larger U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

This hasn't really factored into the Afghan strategy debate, though. The talk has focused entirely on counterterrorism-vs.-counterinsurgency -- or some mix of the two -- with little acknowledgment that it's the U.S. presence itself, rather than a misguided strategy, that's fueling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Comments

[Cy]

What is needed is a true and fair chance to confront Al Qa'ida in Pakistan. Rolling back the troops would lessen North America's armed forces to attack but leaving "The Battlefield" may just the same see more persons joining Al Qa'ida's ranks but not directly for the reason of attacking soldiers in their country.

Their would be a resurgence; anyone who has heard of outfits operating out of the philipines should know that the sentiment can easily spread. Inaction can bring about more agreement with Al Qa'ida by even some of North America's own native born residents.