Anand Gopal Interview: "The Taliban Don't Need Al Qaeda Like They Did Eight Years Ago"

By Steve Hynd

One of the big debates generated by the Obama administration's deliberations over whether or not to send extra troops to Afghanistan has been the exact nature of the relationship between the various Taliban factions and Al Qaeda's leadership. Escalation advocates have argued that the relationship is strong and essential: that any mission which to defeat Al Qaeda must involve defeating the Taliban and that thus a counter-insurgency based strategy is needed, rather than a counter-terrorism one with a smaller American troop presence.

Today, for example, Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation takes to the pages of The New Republic to argue that "at the leadership level, the Taliban and Al Qaeda function more or less as a single entity" - although his entire argument for this seems to me to boil down to the workings of an extended and diffuse network of peer-sharing for what could be termed "best practise" terror tactics and training.

It's said that one should always follow the money. If so, then why is it that if Al Qaeda and the Taliban have merged, as Bergen's headline puts it, that the Taliban are said to have plenty of funding while Al Qaeda is broke?

Alex Thurtston at The Seminal and I recently got a chance to put some questions about the AQ/Taliban relationship to Anand Gopal, an Afghanistan-based journalist who has followed the various Taliban factions and their shifting alliances closely. Here are his answers.

Is Al Qaeda still the threat it used to be?

AQ has been tremendously weakened in the last few years. The drone strikes have done a number on their leadership, whose movements are extremely restricted. In addition, the war with Pakistan has robbed them of many of their safe havens. They are so weak they have had to put out repeated appeals for more fighters to come to the region--something the Taliban have never had to do because recruits for them are not in short supply. Today AQ is mostly an autonomous homegrown or regional affair in the various countries in which it exists--Mauritania, Indonesia, Somalia etc. There's very little evidence of ties between those groups and the leadership in FATA.

So it's lost some support in the region?

Today the AQ completely relies on the Pak. Taliban for its survival. Specifically, it relies on the Mehsud clan in South Waziristan. Most members can't even rely on other tribal areas or commanders for a safe haven or logistical or financial support. Their funding has taken a hit, and they are facing considerable financial strain.

How about AQ's relationship with the Afghan Taliban?

While in 2002 AQ was at heart and mind of the Afghan resistance to the invasion--AQ provided training, funding, logistical support, foot soldiers, etc--the situation is almost completely reversed now. The Afghan Taliban have their own funding network (from taxes, zakat, donations from the gulf states, etc) and are trained mostly independently of AQ (through ISI or their own trainers). In other words, the Taliban don't need AQ like they did eight years ago.

How do you mean, the Taliban don't need AQ like they used to?

The insurgency in 2002 and 2003 was driven by al Qaeda, and it was mostly based along the southeast border with Pakistan. al Qaeda provided trainers and encouraged the Afghans to fight against the U.S. Over time, the Taliban was able to stand on its own feet. Moreover, the Taliban have shown themselves to be remarkably practical. The most recent Mullah Omar statement, for instance, goes out of its way to talk about how the Taliban are not a threat to the world. This is in marked contrast to, say, the Pakistani Taliban, whose leaders have directly threatened the West a number of times.

Finally, what's the relationship between AQ and the Pakistan government?

Pakistan either subtly supported or at least looked the other way regarding AQ 8 or 9 years ago. Today, however, they are at war with AQ. This more than anything else is cause of the group's weakness. So Pakistan supports the Quetta Taliban, but is against AQ.

Update: All Things Counterterrorism blog, written by expert Leah Farrell, fact-checks Bergen and finds him wanting in some crucial places - in particular that some training camps central to attacks in the West that he claims to be Al Qaeda run simply weren't. Leah's conclusion is in line with Anand's: "the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda  is not a marriage, it’s friends with benefits."