COIN? Just Say No

By Steve Hynd

Michael Cohen at Democracy Arsenal has a must-read piece today on why the U.S. shouldn't be trying to develop a massive military counter-insurgency infrastructure.

Dr. Steven Metz, who teaches at the Strategic Studies Institute has a really important post at Small Wars Journal about some of the flawed assumptions driving current US military strategy. According to Metz, he was attending a recent DoD symposium and reports that “everyone nodded when a speaker said that the threats of the future will be dispersed, non-state entities, but few seemed to understand that this obviates the very essence of American strategy and the current focus of the military.”

Precisely. Yet, the ongoing debate between what Andrew Bacevich calls Crusaders and Conservatives regarding the future of US military doctrine seems to miss this critical point. On the hand, we have Crusader John Nagl, the new head of CNAS, who argues that the security challenges of the 21st century will require that the U.S. military be positioned "not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies." On the other hand we have West Point professor Gian Gentile who argues that the military, "ought to be weighted more heavily toward the requirements of conventional warfare."

But as Metz points out, perhaps both Gentile and Nagl have it wrong. For starters, the enshrining of counter-insurgency doctrine presupposes that these types of conflicts will be “the face of battle in the 21st century.” I find this very hard to swallow. Not only is there a lack of political will in the US to engage in the sort of long-term counter-insurgency that we fought in Iraq, but I'm not so sure why we would want our military to engage in this type of conflict. If the Iraq War has shown us anything it is that counter-insurgency is not the most effective type of war for the US military to be fighting - and that the benefits that might be gleaned from such a conflict would be more than outweighed by the costs. Now some might argue that we have no choice but to fight such a conflict that it will be forced upon us. My response is poppycock. The only reason the US would fight a counter-insurgency is if we choose to; and that's a choice we simply should not make because in part, it is difficult to contemplate any sort of protracted counter-insurgency that will further US interests.

As Bacevich succinctly puts it, "If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn’t be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda’s game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?"

Cohen adds that, since there are no real state-based threats to American superiority, America should stop looking for conventional fights to pick too. I suppose that would mean admitting that rag-tag terrorist groups aren't an existential threat and can be effectively contained by law enforcement techniques if they're properly applied - then enjoy a peace dividend while keeping a weather eye on what might come over the horizon.

Cohen adds:

Metz identifies the challenges confronting the US as "dispersed, non-state entities." I would add to that list a host of transnational issues, starting with climate change and moving down the list to health pandemics, global economic instability, vast criminal networks, failing states, the rise of semi-authoritarian governments etc. Guess what? It's not easy to bomb any of these challenges.

The means of best confronting non-state actors or multinational threats is not the sledgehammer of US military force it is instead of confluence of diplomatic engagement, law enforcement tactics, civilian development agencies, democracy and good governance promotion and in some cases, our armed forces. While one could argue that this has always been true, the reality has been quite different. More often than not, we perceive our security threats in military terms and choose to respond in kind. But its about time we recognized that the military is not the primary tool in our arsenal for confronting security challenges, but simply one of many - and in some cases, perhaps the least effective.

He thinks, with Metz, that this means the military's role in promoting American security, and that of the army in particular, will "decline precipitously". And in a sane world he'd no-doubt be correct.

However the Pentagon, perhaps thinking along the same lines, has been mounting a highly affective COIN-style "hearts and minds" campaign to garner to itself all those nation-building capabilities that should be the remit of civilian agencies. Bob Gates has been clear that he expects the military to re-tool as an all-singing, all-dancing COIN nation-building apparatus. Not co-incidentally, there will be no drop in the military's budget allocation due to this refocussing and unlikely ever to be one given that COIN wars last decades and are horrifically expensivebut will be the inevitable consequence of the COINdinistas PR push to say "Can we win wars? Yes we can!"

The military and most of the COINdinistas (including Petraeus, Gates, Nagl and the rest at CNAS) seem only too happy to let the military do those other jobs too...and to build a permanent, costly capability to do those jobs. That suits the army just fine, as it preserves its relevance and then some. But it leaves all the practical tools of nation building in DoD hands and consigns State to being simply door holders for nation-builders in uniforms. You end up with only a military hammer because only they have the standing capability and infrastructure to do these non-military COIN tasks. Call it colonialism by another name.

Not only is that the wrong thing to do by COIN doctrine (which isn't slowing them down one bit), it creates a massive imbalance in both budget allocations and bureaucratic power which could be described best as a military-industrial complex wet dream. That imbalance could have just as far reaching negative implications for American policy at home and abroad as over-reliance on the efficacy of COIN doctrine as a panacea for all foreign policy ills, but it's not even being discussed seriously yet.

Comments

[Peter G.]

Actually I think they should be developing a COIN infrastructure. There may one day be a situation where its use may be justified. Trying to rebuild such an infrastructure only when you need it would be painful to observe. How long does it take to train a competent linguist? Too long once the feces hit the fan.

[Steve Hynd]

Peter, I agree.

But, since an effective COIn architecture is mostly also an effective foreign aid architecture I would prefer they were civilians, not wearing uniforms. Then, when or if the need for their services in a war zone rather than just a friendly third world nation that needs help arises, the uniforms can do their military jobs of armed intervention (i.e. invading), civilian force protection and counter-force operations.

What I object to is the Pentagon's power and budget grab, assuming and being allowed to assume that the vast bulk of COIN forces should be wearing uniforms. That leads to a negative association with colonialism in the minds of those who simply need aid, leads to a negative association between nation-building and the military in the minds of politicians, and allows the DoD to become even more of a resource hog at federal level than it already is.

Regards, Steve

[Peter G.]

Hi Steve
Point taken. The military however, needs to develop at least some of this capability in house since some of the areas where they might be required to deploy such assets might be too dangerous to place civilians. My preference would be to let the state department take the lead where possible.

Peter

[Russ Wellen]

Bob Gates has been clear that he expects the military to re-tool a an all-singing, all-dancing COIN nation-building apparatus. ...

Not only is that the wrong thing to do by COIN doctrine (which isn't slowing them down one bit), it creates a massive imbalance in both budget allocations and bureaucratic power which could be described best as a military-industrial complex wet dream.

You're smoking on this one, Steve. Your remarks are dead-on.