See a nail? Use the COIN hammer!

By Cernig

The US Government's new official Counterinsurgency Guide (PDF) aimed at explaining COIN to policymakers should have been subtitled "Can we invade it? Yes, we can!".

Of course, COIN advocates aren't falling over themselves to paint it that way. Incoming deputy assistant secretary of defense Janine Davidson blogs at Small Wars Journal:

some cringe at the mere articulation of COIN principles in an official government publication; suspecting it might lead us to attempt more such intervention. But as I pointed out in my blog post on FM 3-07, doctrine is not grand strategy or policy. "For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect…Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes." Indeed, this is the core theme – and purpose- of this new publication:

"Such understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and costs of intervention are weighted against US interests in determining whether to become involved and what form that involvement should take. This decision should not be taken lightly: historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated." (COIN Guide, p. 3)

Davidson is being economical with the truth.

The document says, repeatedly, that it doesn't really help too much with the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations as they weren't conceived from the first as COIN/nation-building interventions and are therefore far off the COIN rails already. The documents own criteria would strongly suggest we shouldn't be in Iraq or Afghanistan fighting a COIN intervention in the first place, but takes the view that we're there so we have no choice. (Leading a cynical reader to strongly suspect that the object now, in both places, is to see what cracks can be wallpapered over long enough to head for the exits ahead of the collapse.)

Instead, the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, two years in the writing, is a 60 page blueprint for future US interventions, which it freely admits will be both long and expensive ones that policymakers will try to pass off as short inexpensive ones for political reasons. A typical example of the framing:

An insurgency may actually succeed in overthrowing the government (historically a rare event), may force the government into political accommodation (a more common outcome), may be co-opted by the government and cease fighting (also common), or may be crushed.

Where's the parenthetical "(the rarest of all)" after the last outcome, to show that it isn't most likely on a rising scale of possibilities? Sure, everyone who knows anything about COIN knows it - but does Sen. Doofus (R- Toughtalk) or the mook in the street?

And then there's this, from the conclusion:

"The ultimate intent of this effort is to develop our national capability to support the counterinsurgency efforts of legitimate and responsible governments that respond to the needs of their people."

Yet on page 40 we read that legitimate, responsible governments don't need any help, and that domestic political calculations (cynically: will it be popular, or not) will always drive any decision to employ military force rather than risk assessment:

 a country that scores well on each of the factors listed above, and is therefore a good candidate for assistance, is by definition unlikely to need that assistance in the first place. Countries that are candidates for U.S. engagement in the real world therefore usually score badly on several of these considerations. 

... Unfortunately, there will inevitably be occasions when the assessment of the insurgency situation will weigh heavily against U.S. involvement, but specific U.S. national interests will drive policymakers towards engagement. However, this does not negate the value of thorough assessment. On the contrary; it means that the decision will have been made with a good understanding of the inherent risks and the challenges that will need to be overcome. It may also prompt caution over the form of engagement to be used, perhaps encouraging a more limited involvement from which a subsequent exit can be made with less political consequence.

There's no such thing as an unelective COIN operation unless it happens in your own country. You cannot find yourself involved in one overseas by accident. The message of the Guide is that even if politicians insist on involving the US in stupid overseas military adventures, COIN offers a more palatable military option in terms of US casualties, albeit involving a massive investment of money and manpower over decades. See a nail? Use the COIN hammer!

A good friend of mine, a COIN afficiando, sees something more benign in all this. "Why do we think that attempting to build the capacity to effectively handle insurgencies will lead to elective COIN operations?" he writes.  "Isn't that like saying putting seatbelts in cars is a bad idea because it will only cause people to drive faster and have more accidents?" Well, no. One of the best arguments against neutron bombs or SDI was that both made wars of aggression more winneable, and thus more attractive. Same here. COIN is only useful if you're occupying somewhere (usually somewhere you invaded) - and the more useful it is the more temptation there will be to do just that. Since when has having a better (non- nuclear) weapon led to inclinations not to use it? It's akin to suggesting that tazers are better because they're less lethal, but that moreover that no-one will use them over-zealously or against innocent targets.

I'd rather there was a "wingtips on the ground" element, utterly divorced from the military, that could move in and do USAID properly in allied 3rd world nations that don't have security problems and therefore where no COIN operations are required. If needs, and with effort, that capability could then be mobilized in a COIN occupation setting. But welding the two together at the hip from the get-go is "white man's burden" thinking if you've already conceded, as this paper does, that you're looking to future venues rather than just Iraq and Afghanistan.

The best analogy is to medical care. Do you invest the bulk of your effort and budget in intensive care or in preventative medecine? If the latter, you end up not needing as much intensive care capability anyway. If the former, you inevitably spend all your time and money temporarily prolonging the miserable coma-like existense of terminally ill patients. There's a place for both, sure - but preventative care is the better bet for the bulk of your investment.

Comments

[barrisj]

"The ultimate intent of this effort is to develop our national capability to support the counterinsurgency efforts of legitimate and responsible governments that respond to the needs of their people."

Now there's an elastic definition that any imperialist can get behind. In fact, a country that may indeed be heading for a COIN-operated fix is Pakistan, which is acceding bit-by-bit to US on-site military presence and military actions. There are at least 100 (admitted) SOF "advisors" and "trainers" in-country aiding Pakistani forces combatting insurgents in the NWFP/FATA, and with Obama already on record stating in essence that "as Pakistan goes, so goes Afghanistan", there is no lack of "opportunities" to put theory in practice. Unfortunately, groups opposing federal rule don't just number the usual suspects in FATA, but also a restive peoples in Baluchistan, not to mention Kashmir. Come to think of it, Obama and his Pentagon can really develop an enormous military WPA project here, sucking up tens of thousands of unemployed American youth looking for steady work, AND the opportunity to kill "terrorist" brown people in the advance of freedom. The downside, of course, is that Pakistan is devoid of any high-value natural resource (oil, nat. gas) that could offset cost of such a program. Oh, well, nobody said preserving freedom comes cheap!