Khyber Logistics, Iran and Confidence Building Measures

By Fester

As Cernig noted last night, the Khyber Pass route is temporarily closed again as Taliban affiliated militants blew a bridge just fifteen miles from Peshawar.  This is at least the fifth time in the past couple of months that the major supply route has been shut down, and it will not be the last time.   The Taliban is able to get away with attacking a critical supply line because they have local legitimacy and relevancy with the population and the protectors were either bought off or functioning with minimal legitimacy and minimal local intelligence and trust. 

Also as Cernig noted both last night and last summer, there is a very tempting alternative to the Karachi-Peshwar-Khyber-Kabul supply line that goes through the massive temporary autonomous zone on Pakistan's northern border.  That route is through the Iranian port of Chah Bahar and goes through the western Afghan city of Herat where it then connects to the Afghan Ring Highway which goes through all the major cities in Afghanistan. 

There are two major operational advantages to this route and a potential opening for a significant geo-strategic change in relationships and attitdues.  Operationally, this is a supply line where the Taliban and its Pashtun tribal allies can not shoot at convoys and depots as there are very few people who give either group local legitimacy and cover.  Secondly, it dumps the logistic flow into a relatively safe and secure rear area. 

The greatest advantage is potentially a geostrategic chance in confidence building and mutual interest collaboration between the United States and Iran.  Both the United States, it allies in NATO and ISAF, and Iran  share two common goals.  No one wants to see Al-Quaeda or its descendents and franchisees gain breathing room.  Nor does any of these groups  want Sunni Pashtun extremists in power in Afghanistan.  The reasons differ but the the mutuality of the goal sets gives a strong incentive for local cooperation that could be the first step of a mutual trust but verify engagement process. 

Iran  has long standing disputes with the Taliban and their Pashtun base as Iran nearly went to war against the Taliban in 1998, from the Indian Express qoting the Pakistani Information Minister:

He added that he was ``optimistic'' that an armed conflict could be avoided between Iran, following the murder of eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif last month.

The murders heightened tensions between Shiite Iran and the rival Sunni Muslim Taliban, with Tehran threatening to exact revenge and sending tens of thousands of troops to the border with Afghanistan.

USA Today in 2005 reported the well known fact that Iran backed the Northen Alliance as a counter-proxy to the Taliban both before and during the 2001 invasion and toppling:

Even before U.S. forces entered Afghanistan, Iran backed the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of warlords and militias from the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara minorities. The alliance fought the ruling Taliban, a regime dominated by majority Pashtuns that imposed a harsh Sunni Islamic government.

Current and former U.S. troops and officials confirm Iranians were present with the Northern Alliance as U.S. forces organized the rebels in 2001. They say U.S. forces had no interaction with the Iranians. They deny the Iranians made meaningful contributions on the battlefield.....

James Dobbins, a former State Department official who worked with diplomats from Iran and other Afghan neighbors to create the first post-Taliban government, says the Iranians "were equipping and paying the Northern Alliance. Russia and India were also helping, but at the time, Iran was the most active."

If an alternative supply line can be established through Iran, and both sides live up to their bargains of delivering goods and not spying  (too much and overtly) on each other, positive outcomes will be generated.  First, it reduces pressure on US/NATO and ISAF logistics.  Secondly, it reduces pressure on Pakistan's legitimacy problem by having fewer unpopular convoys go through the northern TAZ, and it increases pressure on the Taliban elements that are not willing to negoatiate.  

NATO is looking at this option.  Fox News elaborates a bit more:

“NATO is looking at flexible, alternate routing. I think that is healthy,” Craddock said, when asked about the possibility of using Iranian territory for supply.

“Options are a good thing, choices are a good thing, flexibility in military operations is essential,” he said. “What nations will do is up to them,” he said, without elaborating....

“Those would be national decisions. Nations should act in a manner that is consistent with their national interest and with their ability to resupply their forces,” Craddock, an American who is NATO’s supreme allied commander, told The Associated Press. “I think it is purely up to them.”....

Some experts suggest that nations with good relations with Iran such as France, Germany and Italy may try to set up an alternate supply route to western Afghanistan via Char Bahar, a port in southeastern Iran.

Iran is most likely open to this as they want to improve their economic and security situations.  The initial steps would be with friendlier NATO nations but if both sides can keep their ends of the bargain of providing reasonably rapid, reasonably secure and reliable logistic routes through territory that has minimal reason to support the Taliban, it increases interconnectivity of nation states fighting against destabilizing and delegitimatizing groups.  Furthermore, it provides an opportunity for both US and Iranian liberals, moderates and reformers to point to an example of mutually beneficial success.  Once the first couple of examples can be found, future cooperation is much easier as the anchoring mechanisms and expectations rest on success instead of acrimony. 

Comments

[Steve Hynd]

Good post.

You have to wonder if, as the Pentagon contemplates Afghanistan and how much Iran could be helping, they mutter "why did we back the Iran-haters and neocons just because they were most likely to fund our shiny toys? How could we have been so dumb?"

Regards, C

[empty]

I remember driving from Herat to Kabul overnight with some other folks interested in "discovery" (this was the early seventies). We had to get to the embassy in Kabul the next day for reasons obscure. It was a comfortable easy drive with good visibility. Very unlike driving through the Khyber pass.