Somalia, We Hardly Knew Ya

by Eric Martin

BJ (down below), Matt Yglesias and Rob Farley beat me to the punch, but it's still worth discussing certain aspects of the recent developments in Somalia.  Basically, the last of the Ethiopian troops (those left over from a December 2006 invasion that the US government actively supported) withdrew from Somalia, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) propped up by Ethiopia's forces quickly fell:

Hardline Islamist insurgents captured the central town of Baidoa on Monday, an important stronghold of Somalia's fragile government and seat of the national parliament, witnesses said.

Just hours after Ethiopiawithdrew its last troops from Baidoa and pulled back across the border, fighters from the militant al Shabaab group moved in. [...]

It has long wanted to take Baidoa, which, along with Mogadishu, was the only place where the government had any physical control.

Thus marks the culmination of yet another of the Bush administration's foreign policy blunders.  Some might argue that simply because our objectives failed (replacing the Islamist Courts Union (ICU) government with the TFG via an invasion by Somalia's longtime regional rival, Ethiopia), that does not mean it was a mistake to back Ethiopia in the first place.  Especially because Ethiopia was going to invade Somalia regardless.

Taking the second part first, it should be noted that Ethiopia gets roughly $500 million in aid from the US each year, most of that allocation coming in the form of military aid.  This puts Ethiopia in the top five of all nations receiving aid from the US.  In other words, the US government has a certain amount of leverage over Ethiopia, and had we let our displeasure be known to the Ethiopian government, there is a good chance that we could have influenced Ethiopia's decision-making.  Regardless, due to the high level of aid we provide, we are already considered by many to be Ethiopia's patron in the region, and, in turn, they have become our perceived representative.  Thus, it is imperative that we either exert pressure on Ethiopia to act in a manner befitting that relationship, or we cease to play the part of blank-check benefactor.

The Bush administration did not consider using aid as leverage to talk Ethiopia down, nor did the Bush administration consider at least to publicly opposing the invasion while not turning off the aid spigot.  Rather, the Bush administration provided air strikes in support of the invasion, allowed special forces to work with Ethiopian troops on the ground and provided other intelligence and logistical support. 

This was an enormously risky gambit, based on questionable assumptions.  Ethiopia and Somalia have been regional rivals for many decades - fighting intermittent wars and other skirmishes throughout that period.  Both countries claim the Ogaden region that is predominately ethnically Somali, but which lies within Ethiopia's borders.  Ethiopia's stated policy objective has been to keep Somalia weakened and destabilized so as to forestall any real challenge over the status of Ogaden.  Given that history, it was reckless to bet on Ethiopia actually intending to - let alone being able to - bring about stability in Somalia through its armed invasion and support for the TFG - which was, itself, lacking popular support within Somalia.

Given those long odds for success, and the dubious motivations of our putative peacemaker, backing the use of military force was especially rash.  Generally speaking, military force should be applied only as a last option when there are no viable alternatives, when the interests are so vital that some action is required AND when there is a good chance of achieving the underlying objectives at acceptable costs within a reasonable time frame.  The decision to back Ethiopia's invasion could be said to have failed at least two of those criteria, but unquestionably the third. 

There was an opening, before the invasion, to try to engage the ICU and work toward furthering the stability that had been brought to the capitol, Mogadishu, and for securing greater cooperation from the ICU with respect to US anti-terror interests.  As for our anti-terror interests, elements of the ICU were believed to be providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda operatives (there is likely some truth to these allegations, though the depth of the connections were exaggerated by the TFG and Ethiopia as a means to garner the support of the US).  I wouldn't rate the odds of success in terms of winning over the ICU on all fronts as particularly high, but it was worth a shot given the enormous costs of Option B - war (more on that below). 

As for our interests, neutralizing the threat posed by al-Qaeda operatives was a valid and important priority, but the means chosen to achieve it were not conducive to success.  Actually, we have made matters worse as those al-Qaeda operatives that we sought are still on the loose, chaos in Somalia has opened more safe havens for terrorists to use, the Horn region has been further destabilized (not that it was particularly stable beforehand) and Ethiopia's brutality has stoked greater anti-Americanism and sympathy for al-Qaeda throughout the Somalia, and other parts of the Horn.

Back to the costs of Option B, though.  The reason that military force should always be the option of last resort is that its use creates unpredictable and uneven outcomes in terms of what was intended, and, generally speaking, a lot of people end up dead, humanitarian crises abound and cycles of violence tend to reverberate and expand outward.  Our dalliance in the Horn has been no different.  According to the UN envoy in August 2008:

Just from the beginning of this year, the number of people in humanitarian crisis has increased 77 percent. That is going from 1.8 million people to more than 3.2 million people.

In December 2008:

[The recent fighting] has displaced over 400,000 Somalis and left millions hungry.

The United Nations estimates that 3.25 million Somalis, or 43 percent of the population, will require food aid until the end of the year.

As I've concluded in a prior post when assessing the scorecard for our backing of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia:

Low-to-non-existent benefits in terms of neutralizing known al-Qaeda operatives while the region has been further radicalized and support for al-Qaeda has surged locally [ed note: indeed]. There is increased instability and violence that allows al-Qaeda and other terrorists to move about, and conduct business, freely (the ICU had provided stability to the capital of Mogadishu which has since evaporated). There has been an increase in the number of dead from the flaring of the conflict, massive refugee flows and widespread humanitarian crises befalling the beleagured Somali people. Our overt support for anti-democratic and belligerent elements has led to a sharp upswing in anti-Americanism as we have become closely identified with the brutality of Ethiopia and the TFG.

It's not just about reversing the Bush administration's shoot first, ask questions later approach.  It's really about honing the questions and assumptions that must precede decisions to employ the military option.  We, as a nation, need to develop a truly comprehensive appreciation for the risks, costs and destruction that are inextricably linked to the use of military force.  At the bare minimum, we cannot afford - either morally, economically or strategically - to continue to back such ill-conceived missions as Ethiopia's latest effort to assail its neighbor and rival in pursuit of the seemingly contradictory goal of bringing stability to the region - all while winning the hearts and minds of the targeted population subjected to the brutality that the conservatives cheered on as the answer to our insurgent problem in Iraq. 

Comments

[Peter G.]

Oddly enough you could apply the same criteria to the appropriateness of diplomacy as you do to war. Diplomacy is a wonderful thing but if you pursue it too long when it is clearly achieving nothing on it's own the piles of corpses tend to get a little monstrous. See Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia etc etc.

[yusuf]

not suprising.

what did the americans and the eithopians expect? invade somalia and expect somalis to welcome them with open arms.

the somali resistance has brought liberation to the country. and the americans and eithios have failed to crush the somali spirit