Russo-Ukraine Tit For Tat

by anderson

The swath of post Russo-Georgian conflict friction continued its widening course recently when Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz recognized that they would not likely complete a new natural gas agreement before the end of the year.  Indeed, the stalemate of such an agreement likely stemmed from Ukraine's failure to pay accounts already past due, which Russia claims stands at some $2 billion for gas so far delivered.  The fracture was further exacerbated when President Medvedev then announced on Russian television that

"The debt should be paid to the last ruble if they do not want the economy to suffer from Russian sanctions. The situation cannot be tolerated any longer."

Once again, Ukraine could face sanctions in the form of a threatened cut off from Gazprom gas supplies, just as occurred in January of 2006.

Never to be undone by Muscavite acrimony, Ukraine's marginalized president, Viktor Yushchenko, announced two days later that Ukraine would  not extend a 1997 agreement with Moscow on the use of Russian military bases in Sevastopol.  Russia's Black Sea Fleet has an established network of bases in Ukraine's Crimea.  Yushchenko issued a decree that required a "a list of proposals for the civilian use of the infrastructure in Sevastopol harbor after 2017," the date when the current agreement expires.  Despite Moscow request for "negotiations on the issue," Yushchenko remains adamant that Ukraine "would not permit an extension of Russia's naval presence in the country after 2017."

Now, 2017 is long way away.  Too long, in fact, for Yushchenko to have much say in the matter.  This episode represents mere diplomatic bluster in the face of economic threats from the Kremlin.  The western friendly Yushchenko also hopes that such grandstanding will appeal to like minded folks in NATO and Washington, who would be more that thrilled at the prospect of Russia being tossed off the Crimean peninsula.

But if this threat does bear the promised anti-Russian fruit, it is easily imagined that the fanciful notion of "civilian use of the infrastructure," will quickly succumb to the always pressing needs of US and NATO military priorities.  The question that now remains is, will this extended threat have any bearing on the current natural gas conflict?  Will Moscow now become more amenable to a pricing agreement?