Bully in a China Shop

by Eric Martin

My American Footprints colleague China Hand has a pair of thought provoking posts on the state of US relations with Pakistan, and the connection therewith to the recent Mumbai attacks.  One major component of China Hand's thesis is that "the Western struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, and to neutralize pro-Taliban and pro-al Qaeda elements in the notorious Inter Services Intelligence directorate (ISI)" is destabilizing Pakistan to the brink of a massive regional conflagration. 

Relatedly, China Hand posits that the attacks in Mumbai were an attempt by "powerful ex-ISI officers like retired General Hamid Gul" to push back against the ISI crackdown, and avert the potential abandonment by the Pakistani government of its pet causes (funding the Taliban and anti-Indian Kashmiri groups).

Unfortunately, the current Pakistani government is weak, and popular opinion in Pakistan is surging against what is perceived as heavy-handed US interference and disregard for Pakistani sovereignty and regional imperatives.

Pakistan’s Zardari government, which is almost doglike in its desire to please the United States, is nervously playing word games about cooperating with India as the United States demands, while it drags its feet in order to keep in step with its domestic constituency.

The U.S. is fully aware of the fragility of the Zardari government, and popular resistance to U.S. aims in the region, and is trying to tread carefully, eschewing the rhetoric of the war on terror. [...]

Trouble is, the War on Terror dog doesn’t hunt anymore where it matters most—Pakistan.

Today the rhetoric of the war on terror is irretrievably linked to the United States, its failed strategy, its dubious objectives…and Islamabad’s coerced participation in a U.S.-orchestrated military, political, economic, and security drama that threatens to rip Pakistan apart.

The Pakistani public is increasingly concerned with what it perceives as a diminished and weakened position vis-a-vis a US-backed India (both in Afghanistan and with respect to direct India-Pakistan relations):

The ISI, which nurtured the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan (with U.S. aid) and supported the Taliban government is not sympathetic to America’s faltering effort to create an anti-Taliban bulwark in Kabul.

It is especially unhappy that the United States has abandoned any pretense of even-handedness in the Pakistan-India relationship.

Washington has overtly tilted toward New Delhi.

An eyebrow-raising nuclear giveaway negotiated bilaterally between the U.S. and India allowed India to normalize its relationship with the international nuclear and non-proliferation community even while the Bush administration denied the same facility to Pakistan.

Even more dangerously, the United States has chosen to allow India to establish itself in Afghanistan—Pakistan’s only regional geopolitical asset and ally, at least when it was controlled by the Taliban--at Pakistan’s expense, thereby coupling a long-term American presence and the fate of the Karzai regime with New Delhi’s continued influence inside Afghanistan.

Now that the battle in eastern Afghanistan has become desperate and Taliban have been exploiting their safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the U.S. has been pulling all the political, military, and economic levers at its command in order to compel Pakistan’s active and effective cooperation in the struggle, and to force Islamabad to accept a security condominium in South Asia by which the U.S. is the dominant power, India its ally, and Pakistan a disrespected client of dubious loyalty and reliability. [...]

However, by the momentum of its policies, the desperate need to keep Afghanistan from going down the tubes, its pro-India tilt in South Asia, and the discovery of another perceived lever to compel Pakistan’s cooperation, the United States appears determined to disregard or steamroll over Pakistan’s obvious anxieties.

In addition, the Bush administration has taken steps that, if inadvertently, emphasize Pakistan's lack of autonomy and sovereignty: from troop incursions into - and repeated bombardment of - Pakistani territory, to direct coordination between the US government and Pakistan's military (circumventing the civilian leadership in Pakistan), to sending US military personnel to address the Pakistani parliament without consultation with Pakistan's foreign ministry (in disregard of Pakistani law and diplomatic protocols), to forcing Pakistan to the IMF for debt relief (where Pakistan's situation was discussed by General Petraeus of all people) on onerous austerity terms that could exacerbate Pakistan's economic crisis (while we reserve the right to implement the Keynsian model), etc.

Our single-minded focus on our objectives in the region - and disregard for Pakistan's sovereignty, and the sensitivity of Pakistan's position vis-a-vis its chief rival, India - is leading to a large-scale anti-United States backlash.  This dynamic does not bode well for the future of the Zedari government (or any other moderate coalition), and could lead to massive internal (or regional violence) that will be blamed on our interference. 

The problems are complex and convoluted.  Some defy any real solution other than those which can be afforded by a prolonged period of unraveling of previously tied knots. Ultimately, Pakistan will have to grapple with the blowback from the choices that it has made to advance its interests in its own regional powerplay.  It will suffer regardless.

That being said, unless the United States relents with respect to some of its objectives, it could end up tearing Pakistan apart.  This is not to say that the US should accept the ISI's actions or chosen proxies in their entirety, but that we might want to prioritize and make some sacrifices in the name of maintaining stability in recognition of the ISI's strength and ability to play massive spoiler. 

For example, we should be more mindful of the steepness of our pro-India tilt, and give Pakistan room to exercise its sovereignty.  Some of that can be achieved with relatively little pain.  Further, we may be better served in the long run by recognizing Pakistan's interest in maintaining a proxy in Afghanistan given its anxiety about an ascendant India.  This might mean that we have to temper our support for Karzai - or incorporate more Taliban elements in the Afghan government.  We may have to do the latter anyway considering the conditions on the ground in terms of an increasingly empowered Taliban insurgency.  In exchange for this offer to Pakistan, we could demand that the pressure be kept on al-Qaeda and those groups funding al-Qaeda. 

While some of these trade-offs might appear unsavory, if we continue to try to have it all in this region, we could quickly end up with much worse than nothing.  This is yet one more reason to reckon with the possibility that maintaining our current posture in Afghanistan is becoming an exceedingly costly endeavor with dubious benefits.