Anbar and Eyl

By Fester:
In 2003, 2004, 2005, and most of 2006, the American approach to counter-insurgency in Anbar Province was a fairly monolithic, firepower based approach where the key metrics were number of IED cells busted, 'suspected' insurgents captured/interrogated and casualties inflicted and received. Large units were routinely employed in brigade and division size sweeps and the insurgency was supposed to be defeated numerous times. The massive use of firepower at Fallujah in November 2004 was partially aimed at crushing the insurgency and demonstrating the cost of opposing the United States. Instead, the US retook a ghost town and lost control of Mosul.

The turn around came when the US stopped seeing a singular enemy and stopped trying to impose an externally derived goal and rule set (subservience to a weak and Shi'ite dominated central government.) Instead, the US realized that there was an alternative, pre-existing and locally legitimate power and influence network where a deal of localized stability and active non-shooting at each other could be cut.

This network was the Sunni Arab tribal network which was willing to cut a deal partially as a result of fighting three wars at once (against foreign jihadis, against the US, and against the Shi'ites) and partially because their traditional sources of power and influence, including the smuggling routes, were being pressed. The Awakening movement was a recognition of tribal authority and some minimalist shared US-Sunni Arab tribal goals, namely a decrease in violence directed at each other, a conservation of strength and a beat down on foreign jihadis.

And this has worked on these common shared objectives although the motivation behind the decision makers is wildly different. It also neglects the massive delegitimazation of the concept of a sovereign Iraqi state and accepts a de-facto partion of Iraq into three sectarian chunks as the Iraqi Army without US airpower can not hold ground in non-mixed or Shi'ite majority areas. But it has worked to reduce violence and achieve minimal goal sets by utilizing local and legitimate power players to clamp down on the most violent extremists.

So what does this have to do with Somali piracy?

Right now there are calls for large scale applications of military power that either is completely unaligned with any faction on the ground or is aligned with the Ethiopian backed and very weak internationally recognized government that can not control most of the capital city. Calls for both blockades by international naval forces and more aggressive US/Russian amphibious raids against known concentrations of pirate activity are loud and clear.

However, I don't think this would work if the definition of work is to permanently reduce piracy within 500 miles of the Somali coastline. The cost of regeneration is miniscule for Somalis who have some familiarity with the sea and there are very few other options on land that can provide for significant income or localized political legitimacy. Large smash and grabs are impressive, but when the capital costs of piracy are a dhow, an outboard engine or two, a good GPS receiver and squad/platoon level infantry weapons in a country that is awash in light weapons, it will be as successful as a brigade size sweep through Anbar was. Caches may be seized, docks destroyed and impressive pictures taken but the insurgency or piracy remains.

There is an alternative strategy that is similar to the locally successful Anbar Awakening. The Islamic Courts Union can take the place of the Anbari tribal networks. They have local legitimacy and has demonstrated the capacity to restore and maintain something that resembles order. Order and external connectiveness is the death knell of piracy and banditry. They have already indicated a beef with the pirates. That beef may be an attempt to pirate the pirates, or it could be a response to Salafist pressures or it could be something else. But the beef is there.

The minimal common goal set of the international community and the ICU would be to maintain order on the coast and diminish piracy back to nuisance levels. This attempt will legitimate the ICU as a serious and valid player in Somalia while further deligitimatizing the TFG which can not control its capital city much less the coast, but this is a minimal cost. It is not a guaranteed strategy, but I think a strategy based on utilizing existing sources of capacity, interests and legitimacy will have a much better chance of working than a naval replication of the 2003-2006 Anbar strategy.

Comments

[kindness]

Having the Islamists police the pirates may help but won't stop pirating. I say that because the Islamists have stated that they only consider pirating of Muslim ships a problem, they have no problem with pirating any other ships.

Now having said that what Somalia needs is some economic assistance & development on the ground. I have no idea how to do that.

[Dave Schuler]

As you've pointed out multiple times having our military chase pirates (or perform convoy duty) isn't cost effective. It might be in the future but it isn't now.

If letters of marque weren't banned by the Constitution, that would be a pretty good solution to the problem.

The most interesting suggestion I've heard is that Somali piracy furthers our grand strategic objectives and we should tolerate it.

[fester]

Dave --- Letters of Marque and Reprisal are constitutional, hell they are an enumerated power. The US gave up on privateers in the 1860s as the Confederates had several at sea before they sent commissioned raiders (Wikipedia) but the US never signed the declaration of Paris. I don't think the US has issued a letter of Marque in a hundred years.

But going back to the economics of counter-piracy work --- where is the profit for the privateer -- it is only in deterance unless there is head money paid by someone else. Capturing a dhow or a small trawler and three outboard power speed boats will not be worth the time to pay the taxes on them....

I'll be responding to Information Dissemination as I think he has it bassackwards as stability is our friend not instability.