Grim Prospects In Afghanistan

By Cernig

Over at The New Atlanticist, the magazine of The Atlantic Council of the United States edited by moderate conservative blogger James Joyner, there's a clear eyed appraisal of the Afghanistan occupation by Donald M. Snow, Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama. I encourage everyone to read the whole thing, which is remarkable in its honesty, especiallly for appearing in America's premier support think-tank for NATO, but here's the really significant bit for me:

The Pentagon has asked for a thorough review at both the conceptual and operational levels. The conceptual part begins with a review of America’s objectives in Afghanistan. It is mind-boggling to think that any country would fight a war for seven years without knowing the objective (what it seeks to accomplish), but unfortunately such a question is not inappropriate.

What is the policitcal objective in Afghanistan? Almost everyone would agree that getting rid of Al Qaeda tops the list, as noted in the last post, but what after that? A democratic, stable Afghanistan? A surgical removal of Al Qaeda from Pashtun territories on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that leads to democratic stability in Pakistan as well? How important are each of these possible objectives to the United States? No one seems to know, or be publicly willing to discuss or defend.

The Pentagon apparently also wants to know which of these goals are achievable, particularly through the application of military force. When the question is asked this way, the prospects become especially grim.

...

How did we get into this terrible mess? The short answer is through inadequate thinking and inattention. Obama is right about taking the eye off the ball in 2001 when we might have destroyed Al Qaeda, but after that failed, we quit thinking about what to do next. Instead, we kept doing the same things that have been failing in the hopes of different outcomes. We still are, and that is not a compliment to our sagacity.

U.S. policy suffers from two major shortcomings in Afghanistan. First, we really do not know what we want to accomplish (what are the objectives?). Beyond eradicating Al Qaeda, do we really care what happens there? Your answer can lead to very different conclusions and courses of action. Second, what CAN we accomplish? The lessons of history do not encourage military adventurism in Afghanistan by outsiders. Ask the British or the Russians, or scores of others before them. The retiring British commander in Afghanistan suggested we could be there another ten years. For what?

[Emphasis mine - C]

The textbook way to military defeat in detail, even when you have overwhelming military superiority at your command, is to fritter away that superiority chasing ever-fluctuating political chimeras rather than militarily-attainable objectives. Yet after the invasions succeeded (because they were clear-cut missions winnable by a well trained and well equipped military), that's what happened. This really is the central point of criticism of Bush policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is likewise the central point in McCain's continuance of those policies. Yet seven years after the fact, we're no closer to giving the troops a mission that troops can accomplish and there's little prospect that they will be given such a mission even if they stayed ten years. Better to bring them home instead of frittering their lives and national treasure away on chimeras that cannot be won by military might.