So is there an Endgame?

By BJ

One of the biggest problems with most wars is that they generally don't offer any "capture the flag" moment where both sides can generally agree that the issue has been decided and the winner can walk away with the spoils and the loser can go off to mope and start planning for a revenge match. Too many people have been hopelessly deluded by the complete capitulations of Germany and Japan at the end of WWII, and seem to figure that wars have to continue until "Victory!" is achieved.

The Georgians are certainly not going to storm Moscow when they couldn't even finish off a small city a couple miles from their border, and though they are likely capable of it, the Russians don't appear inclined to storm Tbilisi anytime soon.

The Georgians appear to be trying to extract themselves from the foolish gamble Saakashvili took with South Ossetia, (foolish in the sense that it failed, had the Georgians managed to reach and block off the Roki tunnel, this would have been a completely different ballgame), but it appears that their forces have only withdrawn to the pre-Aug. 6 lines. Like the Kandori Gorge in Abhkazia, there are portions of the traditional boundaries of South Ossetia that were under Georgian control before this latest flare-up.

The Russians, for their part, seem to be demanding a status change for South Ossetia, though whether that means independence or annexation is anybody's guess, as well as a non-aggression pledge from Georgia, and possibly the removal of Saakashvili from power.

So the questions then become: Will the Georgians accept any of that? And if they don't, what can the Russians do about it?

So far the Russians have limited their attacks to the conflict zones, the Georgian staging areas just outside of them, and a few other strategic targets, though that list of "other" targets does seem to be growing. If the Georgians don't capitulate far enough, soon enough, the Russians seem to be prepared to begin a kind of "Effects Based Operation" on Georgia's infrastructure to bring them to heel.

That may work, but it may just cause the Georgians to rally. Prior to the current dust-up, the Georgian opposition was less than thrilled with Saakashvili's rule, but have been mostly silent or supportive now that the fighting has gotten underway, (much like every other nation, its pretty damned hard to criticize your government when bombs are falling around you without looking, and probably feeling, like a traitor).

How much further would the Russians be willing to go? Douglas Muir has just posted some speculation that the Russians are moving beyond South Ossetia.

Various sources are reporting that the Russians have rolled out of South Ossetia and into Georgia proper, and are mounting a major attack on the town of Gori. Gori is about 15-20 km south of the South Ossetian border, and about 70-80 km from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. Russian forces are also massing along Georgia’s border with Abkhazia, preparing to open a second front there.

. . .

[I]f Russia really is entering Georgia in force, it’s about to become a different sort of game altogether. Russia has no reason to do that unless it’s gunning for regime change. Attacking Gori is right at the bleeding edge of plausible self-defense; Gori is near the border, and has been the forward base for Georgian operations in South Ossetia. But going beyond Gori, landing forces on the Georgian coast, or attacking in force out of Abkhazia, would be something else again.

I'll note again Joshua Foust's cautionary post about taking reports too seriously until they can be verified by some independent sources on the ground. The NYT is carrying the report, but its only source for now appears to be the Georgian government, (h/t LGM), and even Muir doesn't seem entirely convinced of the reports.

It’s hard to believe. Their actions so far could be a prelude to invasion. But they’re also consistent with a more reasonable set of goals: driving the Georgians well back, damaging their ability to make war, and inflicting maximum humiliation on Saakashvili’s government. And if part of this has been about Putin demonstrating his primacy over all rivals, then a short victorious campaign — as opposed to a longer war for regime change — seems like the best outcome for him.

Which is basically in line with my own thoughts on the matter, but also brings me back to my main question; How do the Russians end their short, currently victorious campaign?

And the other question that inevitably comes up is what, besides a strongly-worded, sure to be vetoed, UNSC resolution, can the US or the rest of the international community do about it? There are of course, some who contemplate the US and Nato coming to Georgia's rescue.

So there is something NATO could do. It could threaten with military action or, better, intervention and it could start talking to Russia actively to convince the Russians to stop their aggression. If this does not suffice, NATO countries can punish Russia by other means, and they can start the procedure to send peacekeepers to the region. Turkey, an important NATO ally, is located close to Georgia; Turkey’s territory can be used by NATO to push the Russian forces back into Russia. Such a threat alone would be suffice to push the Russians back into their own territory.

It's hard to over-emphasize the sheer delusional lunacy of such a proposal. Turkey does share a border with Georgia, but it seems unlikely that they're chomping at the bit to re-start the Russo-Turkish wars, and just where the hell does Michael think NATO is going to come up with the forces needed to even pose a credible threat to Russian troops in the Caucasus, let alone capable of carrying through on a threat to "push the Russians back into their own territory"? What, once the US is finished flying Georgia's Iraq contingent home, they and the Brits should pack up and march north through Iraqi Kurdistan and set up in Turkey?

The Russians, apparently unlike MVDG, know how to do math, and are quite aware that the US and NATO have used up their readily-deployable forces dealing with the twin insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. That's likely what was behind Putin telling Saakashvili in April that he could shove Western assurances where the sun don't shine.

The lunacy of a NATO or US intervention also fails to acknowledge that both need Russia's assistance for a whole host of other reasons.

For the Bush administration, the choice now becomes whether backing Georgia — which, more than any other former Soviet republic has allied with the United States — on the South Ossetia issue is worth alienating Russia at a time when getting Russia’s help to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions is at the top of the United States’ foreign policy agenda.

One United Nations diplomat joked on Saturday that “if someone went to the Russians and said, ‘OK, Kosovo for Iran,’ we’d have a deal.”

That might be hyperbole, but there is a growing feeling among some officials in the Bush administration that perhaps the United States cannot have it all, and may have to choose its priorities, particularly when it comes to Russia.

Add to that Russia's almost complete control of the oil routes out of the Caspian producing regions, the assistance and logistical support for the Afghan mission, and the diplomatic efforts in regards to North Korea's nuclear program, and pobably a great deal more that the West needs Russian support on to be successful. As Daniel Larison states:

It’s an encouraging sign that this feeling is growing at least among some officials, but what does it say about this administration that they apparently believed that the U.S. could have it all and didn’t need to prioritize which policies were more important and which were secondary?  This is the crew that thought it could expand NATO twice in five years and recognize Kosovo, all the while berating Russia for its internal political conditions, and then ask the Russians for help with Iran as if nothing had happened.

What it says about the administration is that they look at each problem in isolation, ignoring its possible repercussions elsewhere. It's why they have no problem supporting Kosovo breaking away from Serbia, but refuse to acknowledge any suggestion of the same right for the Georgian enclaves, while likely to take an opposing line once again should Chechnya start feeling its oats once again.

Well, enough ranting. The next couple of days should tell us a great deal more, and it should be very interesting to see if the Russians will take their victory and go home, or push beyond the rational endpoint and get sucked into a drawn-out insurgency. (And frankly, if they push it that far, it would serve them right.)

In other news of note, Daniel Nexon has a good post on the Ukrainian threat regarding the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and LGM has possible news of an American being captured helping the Georgian forces.

Comments

[Bubba]

According to some reports, Tskhinvali is still taking artillary and Grad rocket fire from Georgian positions around and in Gori.

http://lenta.ru/news/2008/08/11/again/

It is to be expected that the Russians will continue offesive operations to:

- push Georgian Military, Police and Paramilitary units out of South Ossetia, in particular, the positions they controlled prior to the outbreak of the conflict. In general, these positions were used to launch the attacks, and it is good military doctrine to negate these positions. Last time I checked, Epic Losers don't usually get a return to the status quo.

- continue offensive operations against Georgian positions in Georgia, that are attacking areas of South Osettia. That means that Grad is a valid target as long as Georgian Military positions and facilities in and around Grad are being used to shell Tskhinvali. The Russian will probably insist on some form of DMZ along the Georgian and South Ossetia border.

- continue attacking Georgian military and infrastructure in Georgia until such time as there is a surrender or ceasefire. The indescriminate Georgian levelling of Tskhinvali with massed artillary fire as an opening move, gave the Russians a very wide "tit for tat" list of targets that so far, they appear to have been very restrained about. Russia will want to "punish" the Georgian Military and set them back a decade in Military expenditures.

For me, the big question is, will the opportunity be taken by either Russia, or the Abkhazians, to push the Georgians out of Abkhazia as well.

[Steve]

You`re right about it being delusional regarding some sort of NATO response to this affair. I remember reading somewhere that Russia supplies roughly 40% of Europe`s natural gas supply, so we`ll likely hear not much more than the usual posturing and bloviating blah blah blah etc, or else Pooty Poot will turn off the tap. I think we just got a little sand kicked in our face.