What's the value of a few nukes...

By Fester:

Cheryl at the Whirled View is hosting another blogtank on a great question.  She has already gotten some amazing responses but I want to throw in my thoughts on this problem:

What strategies are available to a country with fissionable material sufficient for 1-5 nuclear weapons, some of which may be assembled? Take into account probable responses, and assume some sort of rationality on the holders of these weapons and material. You may specifically refer to Iran and North Korea, or any other nation, or make the scenario(s) more general. Flesh out the scenario with some support.

Under my scenario, one to five nuclear weapons are not particularly useful for security enhancement as the weapons are not yet a credible minimal deterrant but are an invitation for a combination of pre-emptive/preventive strikes, significant isolation, and staggering amounts of over-confidence.  I am assuming that these weapons are not particularly sophisticated weapons and instead are comparatively simple implosion weapons. This means they are small in yield, heavy, and not the most reliable in the first few generations of designs. 

So what good are nuclear weapons in small numbers?

If the design program and the political program maximizes the number of weapons at no more than five, they are a minimally effective sabotage deterrant.  They can be emplaced under very strict command and control to destroy critical infrastructure that would severely negate the conquest value of a country.  However they should not be counted on to prevent an invasion as the deterrant value may or may not be recognized as credible due to the limited number of weapons produce which would preclude the ability to credibly test the weapons.  If the first weapon test was a fizzle, the deterrant capacity is minimal.  The deterrant capacity is minimized due to a combination of very few available weapons and doubts about the validity and reliability of the basic design.  Fizzles are a real concern for new nuclear nations. 

Strict command and control would be needed as a few nuclear weapons that are locally controlled instead of nationally controlled would provide a coup plotter with an excellent bargaining chip --- resign and flee to Switzerland or you'll lose your largest city....  That threat never needs to be uttered, but it is a real potentiality. 

Now if the warhead design is advanced enough to be reduced in size enough to be mounted on either ballistic missiles or on tactical aircraft and the national political leadership has confidence that those warheads can be delivered to their targets, the equation changes. A minimal counter-value deterrant doctrine could be developped.  However since there are very few weapons and very few delivery systems, this deterrant is still minimal or non-credible.  It has the thinnest patina of credibility if the delivery force is highly mobile, highly camoflaged and highly available.  However this force is still a very tempting pre-emptive strike target as only a few targets actually need to be hit to dramatically decrease the probability of a weapon getting airborne.  Also in this scenario, I am assuming some nations will have decent air defense and IRBM and SRBM defenses along the lines of PAC-3 or S-300 systems.  The small nuclear force is not a survivable second strike deterrant, nor even a particulary credible first strike counter-value pre-pre-emptive deterrant. 

So what is the value of one to five nuclear weapons?  Internal sabotage is a viable mission if the long term nuclear weapons count is capped at less than five.  The most valuable mission of building nukes 1 through 5 would be it enables building nuke 6 through 50 in far shorter time than not building nukes 1 through 5.  At that point minimally credible and survivable deterrants are useful, and testing is a very plausible route. 

Comments

[Jimbo]

There is also the ability to use the weapons as "Invasion" spoilers, through aysymetric delivery methods, ( fast attack boat, emplaced as a landmine, the mother of all truck bombs), against an Invasion force, beachhead, or Invasion Fleet.

This would allow a Second or Third World Nation, to one time only, inflict major casualties on a First World Forces, perhaps stalling the Invasion, ( through major loss of assets) long enough, and changing the scale of the conflict, to the point where imposed solutions were made. In some sense, one can note that there is no right or wrong when nuclear weapons are in play, there are just survivors and the dead.

Regions do not want to play that game, and so, I would guess that in such an event, both side would be forced to a cease fire rather quickly.