RAND Report for Air Force advises against Iran attack
By Cernig
Jim Lobe at IPS goes where the mainstream fears to tread, reporting on a major think-tank paper for the Air Force:
Entitled "Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities," the 156-page report ... called for Washington to "tone down" its policy statements supporting "regime change" and to "discourage Iranian ethnic groups from revolting against the regime". Both policies, it said, are likely to be counter-productive.
Instead, according to the three main authors of the study, Washington should adopt a more patient approach, "designed to create conditions for effective relations (with Tehran) over the long haul."
As with the Soviet Union, "(w)ith Iran, the U.S. government will again need to keep an eye on the long term, communicating with the current government but also encouraging more discussion among Iranians and more contacts and interactions between Iranians and Americans."
"Societies and governments change. The U.S. government has some ability to foster favourable trends in Iran, but these policies will take time to come to fruition," said the report, which also noted that Iran "appears to be on its way to becoming a nuclear power".
I've not seen a lot about this report in the mainstream media. They seem to prefer the Rand report on Iraq to report upon. I wonder why that is?
the RAND study bolsters those who favour engagement with Iran, even as it also supports the maintenance of certain kinds of sanctions, notably the embargo on certain high-tech gas liquefaction technologies, as a bargaining chip for future negotiations with Tehran. To increase pressure on the regime, the report also recommends expanding contingency plans to seize Iranian foreign bank and commercial accounts and encouraging U.S. allies to bar certain Iranian officials associated with the nuclear programme from obtaining visas for foreign travel.
As for the possibility of an attack, however, the report is clear that such an option will almost certainly be counter-productive, particularly with respect to Washington's hopes that it could result in diminished support for the regime or even its overthrow.
"A large majority of Iranians strongly believe that Iran has the same right as other nations to develop nuclear energy, including the construction and operation of nuclear enrichment facilities," it said. "If Iran's facilities were to be bombed, public support for any retaliation its government took would likely be widespread."
The most likely response, indeed, would be a "strong push to retaliate (as) [c]ritics of such a policy would likely choose to keep silent" in the nationalist backlash that would ensue.
Moreover, such an attack "would be unlikely to stop the Iranian nuclear programme," according to the authors. While it might set back the economy in certain ways, the resulting increase in oil prices would enable the government "to finance the reconstruction of the facility and continue the current programme without major budgetary consequences."
Another option, a blockade of Kharg Island, Iran's main loading terminal, or the Straits of Hormuz to prevent Iranian oil from being exported, would indeed have a "devastating effect" on Iran's economy, but it would also "probably do more to solidify public support for the regime than weaken it," according to the report, which also noted the likelihood that such a step would ensure a sharp rise in global oil prices and probably result in Iranian attacks on tanker traffic in the Gulf.
The report also warned against covert action programmes designed to aid minority opposition groups, as "Iranian security forces have convincingly shown that they can handle restive ethnic groups, and violent opposition to Iranian rule is more likely to entrench the current security and political forces than to elicit a positive change in regime policies."
Instead, Washington should concentrate its efforts on fostering conditions for a more pluralistic Iran in favour of a more patient approach toward a regime that the report said "most Iranians perceive ...as legitimate."
Ah - calls for foreign policy patience and a reversal of the meme that Iranians don't think their own government is legitimate. That explains it. The MSM so isn't good at patience or reversals of their own dearly held narratives.




























Well, the GDG foreign policy "elite" are going to ignore both reports because each one says something no one in Washington wants to hear.
"There is no battlefield solution to terrorism."
Who in Washington these days is going to listen to that? While RAND's reports are quite good, I expect they will be universally ignored inside the Beltway, like most sensible advice.
Posted by: anderson | July 31, 2008 at 08:19 PM
Oh, sorry, wrong report. I was talking about RAND's Counterterrorism Report, which also sports advice uncomfortable to the consensus.
Posted by: anderson | July 31, 2008 at 08:22 PM
Cernig,
Sorry for another comment, but in light of that "other RAND report" discussing the failures of the occupation and the CPA, if you have not seen No End in Sight, I would highly recommend a viewing. Must see stuff. It addresses the very issue of the failure of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer's disastrous decisions, and Rumsfeld's idiocy.
Failure, that is, if you believe that it was the goal to quickly create a functional and independent Iraqi state. I remember walking out of the theatre thinking that all the bungling couldn't possibly be just bungling.
Posted by: anderson | July 31, 2008 at 08:33 PM