Obama On Iraq

By Cernig

Barack Obama has an op-ed in the New York Times today over which a lot of "e-ink" will be spilled. In it, he sets out his Iraq policy in no uncertain terms.

The Surge has succeeded tactically - violence is dramatically down - and failed strategically - political reconcilliation between the various factions is not dramatically up. But the Iraqi government finally agrees with the Iraqi people that it is time to put a timetable on ending the occupation and that is what we must therefore do. A 16 month drawdown to a residual training-and-protection force is perfectly doable in logistic terms and it will enable the U.S. to once again concentrate its resources and attention on the true "central front", Afghanistan. This, not Bush and McCain's muddy dream of permanent colonialism, is the right way forward. How can it be surrender if "we would be turning Iraq over to a sovereign Iraqi government"?

It's all pretty middle-of-the-road progressive and in tune with the majority of American opinion, and framed well. That point about how turning over Iraq to the Iraqi people cannot be surrender is particularly adroit. It leaves the Right grasping for straws over flip-flops on the Surge, as if the Surge was the truly important thing in and off itself. They're right that Obama has been inconsistent on the Surge, they're wrong that it matters in the wider scheme of things - missing the wood for the trees. Many, including myself, would argue that the Surge wouldn't have been successful in reducing iraq's violence if it hadn't been partnered by other factors, the Awakening movement and the Mahdi ceasefire, which were never a part of the Surge's original plan but which were exploited as welcome gifts from the Gods by Petraeus. In comparison, McCain backed the Surge but also backed the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses which got us in the mess in Iraq the Surge provided temporary surcease from in the first place and got us in the mess in Afghanistan that the Surge actually exacerbated. That's a far more egregious failing.

While violence in Iraq seems to have found a new, lower, plateau that violence has not disappeared entirely and shows no sign of doing so. Current levels are still comparable to those which were originally enmough, post-invasion, to see the breakdown of an integrated Iraqi society and there are plenty of rumblings saying a new cycle of intramural violence may be about to begin. The Green Zone elite have curbed the Mahdi Army somewhat but it is no spent force and the same elite are looking at making an identical move on the Awakening next, which they see as just as much of a rival as the Sadrist movement. It remains to be seen whether these faction-fights will cause another spike of violence, and whether it will be as bad as some of the previous ones, but crucially these are internal Iraqi feuds and it should be up to the Iraqis themselves to wage them or not as they wish.