Bad Cop and Bad-Faith Cop

By Cernig

Some optimistic souls are describing the Bush administration's decision to send undersecretary of State for political affairs Burns to negotiations in Geneva, and talk of opening a special interest section in Tehran, as a seismic shift in Iran policy. Others, more cynical, are describing it simply as the US pretending to play good cop to Israel's bad cop. Blake Hounsell of FP Passport is among the latter.

So is veteran reporter Gareth Porter, who explores the ins and outs of the lead up to those Geneva negotiations in detail today.

White House spokesperson Dana Perino and State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack both described the Burns participation as "a one-time" offer. McCormack said no further meetings were planned unless Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme.

McCormack also said Burns's role in the meeting would be limited to one of listening rather than actually negotiating. That combination of a one-time participation and the absence of any negotiating brief sharply reduces the diplomatic significance of the decision.

The decision falls short of what had been planned by the six powers, also known as the P5+1, last spring. They had agreed informally on a "freeze or freeze" proposal that would allow preliminary talks to take place involving the United States and Iran on the nuclear programme over a six week period.

Diplomatic sources have described the "freeze for freeze" as requiring that Iran would not add any more centrifuges and the six powers would not act to increase its sanctions during the six-week period.

According to an EU source with direct knowledge of Solana's meetings with Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki and nuclear negotiator Jalili, on Jun. 14, however, what Solana presented was different from the "freeze for freeze" proposal that had been discussed among the six powers.

The source was not authorised to explain the difference between the two proposals, but it now appears that Solana could not present the original freeze for freeze proposal on behalf of all six powers because the most important actor of all --- the United States -- had objected.

... Any sign of U.S. interest in negotiations has encouraged Iranian leaders to be more forthcoming on talks. Even Rice's willingness to sign the six-power incentives document was reported by the Times to have "visibly stunned" Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki. So Iran may well seek to exploit Burns's presence in the meeting to offer a new proposal for a deal in order to extend the talks.

But against Bush's history of pulling back from negotiating decisions under Cheney's influence, the approval of the Burns trip to Geneva for a single meeting with Iran's negotiator seems more like a Bush non-decision on Iran policy than it does a fundamental policy shift.

Or, as I suggested yesterday, more like simply throwing some sand in the cogs of diplomacy while at the same time salvaging a little of Bush's legacy by throwing out PR-worthy snippets suggesting - but not actually acting upon - a new spirit of compromise and negotiation.

Update: To clarify, Blake isn't as cynical as Gareth or myself. In comments, he writes: "I don't think the U.S. is pretending -- I think the diplomacy is real, but it may not succeed. Israel is the one doing the pretending here, because I think the Israelis are bluffing." I'd point Blake to the way in which Burn's role is to glower from the fringes, keeping the Euros in line, as evidence that the U.S. isn't trying to negotiate in good faith here.

Comments

[Blake Hounshell]

I don't think the U.S. is pretending -- I think the diplomacy is real, but it may not succeed. Israel is the one doing the pretending here, because I think the Israelis are bluffing.