Blowing the Fight Against Al Qaeda

By BJ

The New York Times has a long article out today examining the less than stellar progress made by the Bush administration in fighting al Qaeda on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. Among other highlights are infighting between and within agencies, timidity by White House officials, accommodation to Musharraf, and my personal favourite, diversion of resources and attention to Iraq and the subsequent loss of US standing that resulted.

Some choice quotes on that last.

The story of how Al Qaeda, whose name is Arabic for “the base,” has gained a new haven is in part a story of American accommodation to President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whose advisers played down the terrorist threat. It is also a story of how the White House shifted its sights, beginning in 2002, from counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to preparations for the war in Iraq.

. . .

Current and former military and intelligence officials said that the war in Iraq consistently diverted resources and high-level attention from the tribal areas. When American military and intelligence officials requested additional Predator drones to survey the tribal areas, they were told no drones were available because they had been sent to Iraq.

. . .

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 added another complicating factor, by cementing a view among Pakistanis that American forces in the tribal areas would be a prelude to an eventual American occupation.

. . .

“We had to put people out in the field who had less than ideal levels of experience,” one former senior C.I.A. official said. “But there wasn’t much to choose from.”

One reason for this, according to two former intelligence officials directly involved in the Qaeda hunt, was that by 2006 the Iraq war had drained away most of the C.I.A. officers with field experience in the Islamic world. “You had a very finite number” of experienced officers, said one former senior intelligence official. “Those people all went to Iraq. We were all hurting because of Iraq.”

. . .

Intelligence reports were painting an increasingly dark picture of the terrorism threat in the tribal areas. But with senior Bush administration officials consumed for much of that year with the spiraling violence in Iraq, the Qaeda threat in Pakistan was not at the top of the White House agenda.

Add to that the story yesterday pointing out that the only way for US to increase troop strength in Afghanistan is to pull them out of Iraq since the US military has no reserve capacity in its ground forces.

The whole NYT story is well worth the read, but as the situation in the region grows ever bleaker, it is the above facts that will haunt Bush’s legacy. Even if by some magical and superhuman effort, his successors can turn Iraq into a successful state once again, the opportunity cost of the invasion and subsequent occupation will easily dwarf any of the, (so far imaginary), benefits.