Iran is willing to talk

By Fester:

Dr. iRack at Abu Muqawama is passing along a few interesting tidbits concerning Iranian influence and efforts in Iraq.  Right now Iran seems to be looking for a wide ranging set of discussions about spheres of influence and mutually agreeable arrangements on most/all Iraq related issues. 

Dr. iRack took note of some big news today: the Iranians have decided to halt talks with the United States over the security situation in Iraq until American forces stop their assault on Sadr City...

U.S. strikes in Sadr City are aimed at JAM factions rocketing the Green Zone and attacking U.S. forces with Iranian made weapons. In this context, the current U.S. position seems to be that the Iranians want it both ways: they want to keep dialing up the violence in Baghdad but then demand an end to the U.S. (counter-)offensive before talks on calming the overall security situation can resume. Blame for the failure in diplomacy seems to reside squarly on the shoulders of Tehran.

However, the picture may be more complicated. Readers will recall that, in Basra, Iran intervened to de-escalate the conflict (not because they're nice, but because they sought to avoid an all-out intra-Shia civil war in the south). When violence spilled over into Baghdad, however, the Iranians seemed content to keep backing Shia militants in an attempt to bloody American noses. But Dr. iRack has heard credible RUMINT that Iran also offered to initiate talks to help end the fighting in Sadr City in the context of wider discussions on the full range of U.S.-Iranian disputes--that is, the kind of sweeping diplomatic engagement many Iran analysts now recommend--but the United States rejected the overture. Scattered news reports seem to corroborate

He offers a theory that this rejection is partially being shaped by US officials being shell shocked from the intermittent Sadrist/JAM barrages on the Green Zone, but this seems a bit simplistic when a significant faction of the US senior leadership at both the civilian and military level are looking for a fight with Iran.  Holding talks is a great way of slowing down that fight from happening.  And advocating talks or at least a less confrontational posture is not good for an individual's career or prestige as the example of Admiral Fallon shows, and the counter-example of Gen. Petreuas illustrates the incentives for toeing the line within the machinations of Topaki Palace on the Potomac.