Outlier Reports In Iraq

By Cernig

I'm busy in the real world today so any posts will be hit-n-run, but I really wanted to mention a report from the AFP that says everything's going swimmingly in Basra. I'm getting tired of reading about this "great news" on conservative blogs because the AFP's report is a real outlier, unconfirmed by other reporting, that reads like the reporter was led through the Iraqi Army version of the dog and pony show perfected by the US military. It's like reading a report about how safe a Baghdad market is when the observers were led around by the nose and accompanied by armed guards...and then concluding that Baghdad is as safe as Indiana.

The AFP's report says this:

An AFP correspondent said three northwestern neighbourhoods once under the firm control of the Mahdi Army militia of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr -- Al-Hayaniyah, Khamsamile and Garma -- are now encircled by Iraqi troops who are carrying out door-to-door searches.

Two other neighbourhoods once dominated by the Mahdi Army, Al-Qiblah in the southwest and Al-Taymiyyah in the centre, have been cleared of weaponry and many people have been arrested, military officials say.

The only trouble with that is...if you look at a map of Basra showing the Mahdi strongholds, it makes it clear that somewhere between one third and one half of the city is still under Mahdi Army control after a month of the Iraqi Army, with heavy US air and special forces support, battling irregulars. Parsing that as success by associating it with a "you see what we want you to see" tour is stretching credulity too far.

Moreover, the Sunni Police and Army commanders who had been installed by the Brits in Basra precisely because they would be above intra-faction Shiite feuding have now been reassigned back to Baghdad - and you can bet they will be replaced by ISCI/Badr Brigade apparatchiks. So even if Maliki's forces eventually win in Basra, how is that a good thing? It's about political supremacy at gunpoint in advance of the regional elections, not establishing the rule of law.

Maliki's allies are also more closely tied to Iran than Sadr has ever been. The National Council Of Resistance of Iran explicitly accuses the Badr Brigade and ISCI of being Iran's main proxies and of knowingly sheltering Iranian agents in their higher ranks. In January 2007, they reported:

Some of these people are among senior political figures of Iraq. They receive monthly salary from the clerical regime, while they are considered as senior officials of the Iraqi government.

There are 481 representatives of Khamenei in the Badr Corps. Some of them hold key positions in the Iraqi government and Parliament. In all of its units, departments and general command, representatives of Khamenei ensure that his orders and directives are carried out. They report directly to Khamenei's Office.

A part of the list contains details on individuals have been transferred from the Badr Corps to other sections. While, officially they are listed as being purged or laid off, some of them have actually been hired by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or assigned by the Qods Force to extra-territorial missions. Their names appear on the list.

The 9th Badr Corps still maintains several centers inside Iran and coordinates the arrival and departure of these individuals to and from Iran. The Badr Corps' main headquarters is in Tehran.

...Since the transfer of the Badr Forces to Iraq, its budget is being paid by the Qods Force. This budget is under the title of "Budget and salary of extra-territorial forces."

Members of the Qods Force take the money to border zone in Mehran (in the central sector of the border), where the money is handed over to the Badr agents. Badr agents subsequently take the money to Iraq and transfer it to office of SCIRI in Jaderyieh district of Baghdad.

The individual in charge of finances of SCIRI is named Abu Kawthar.

The representatives of Badr in various provinces go to Baghdad to receive the money.

The office of the personnel of Badr has set up a system in each Iraqi city to distribute the salary of the personnel by designated representatives.

The financial section of the Badr cooperates closely with the accounting and financial bureau of the Qods Force, which is headed by IRGC Brig. Gen. Allahyari. The name of the liaison officer between the Qods Force and Badr Corps is Naghdi.

...IRGC Brigadier General Mojtaba Abtahi, based in Fajr garrison in Ahwaz in southern Iran, one of the main bases of the Qods Force in southern Iraq, notifies his contact in Najaf by the name of Hamid Hosseini.

Hamid Hosseini is director of the center affiliated with the Qods Force in Najaf.

On behalf of the Fajr garrison, one team goes to Shalamcheh border region, where in coordination with Iraqi customs agents who belong to the Badr Corps, they obtain the permit to cross the border and drive to the Fajr garrison, where weapons and money is hidden in the car.

...Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the primary types of weapons transferred at this border crossing.

In coordination with Fajr garrison, other weapons and ammunitions are transferred to Iraq through Bostan, Howizeh and Hour-al Azim border crossing in Missan province.

For instance, an operations chief in Baghdad, in contact with commander of a terror network of Badr in Baghdad, said that in November 2006 IEDs entered Iraq from the Basra border crossing. Once he received a number of these devises, be blew them up on December 11, 2006 in Showleh street in front of Javadieh and Rahmanieh as a column of coalition forces was passing by, resulting in the death of coalition forces.

Conservatives often cite NCRI as a reliable source when talking about Iran's nuclear program but when it contradicts the current Sadr=bad, Badr=good narrative it is sidelined and ignored. Unfortunately for the narrative, other less partisan sources as well as the arrangement of the Basra "truce" also confirm that Maliki's "Persian Ex-Pats" are more beholden to Iran than any of their rivals.

But I tell you what isn't an outlier report -  the desertion under fire of an entire 80-man company of the Iraqi Army in Baghdad wasn't an isolated incident no matter how often pro-occupation pundits say it was. It follows a long line of such incidents including the over 1,300 desertions in Basra recently and stretching back to the wholesale desertion of the original Iraqi force in Fallujah. Worse, even after receiving the attention of the cream of Iraq's armed forces and heavy US support, Sadr City is still a Mahdi stronghold - just like North and West Basra. This could be shaping up to be a success in the same order as the German seige of Stalingrad.

Comments

[nabalzbbfr]

I suppose that reports of the rescue of British photographer Richard Butler by the Iraqi Army in Basra must be some kind of mass hallucination. My bad.

[nabalzbbfr]

And for some much needed perspective on the NYT story about the desertion of some Iraqi Army company, see

http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2008/04/the_bigger_picture_with_the_ir.asp

[Steve Hynd]

Nabal, does it strike you as odd that the IA found this reporter so easily and without a fight? That he wore a hood the whole time? That no group has been blamed or taken responsibility for the kidnapping? I'd like more details before I call it a success story.

As to your other comment, I addressed that in the post. Do you even read the posts? Because I know you're a busy serial troll so if not I'll be happy to ban you and save you the trouble of commenting on posts you didn't have the time to read.

Regards, C