Differences in Analytical Assumptions on Iraq

By Fester:

One of the big differences in lenses that people are using in analyzing Iraq is best encapsulated by the following statement by William Lind of Defense in the National Interest.  If you disagree with his fundamental premise of a Iraq as a Potemkin state then you believe Iraq is going reasonably well with only a couple of bumps in the road.  If you fundamentally agree (as I do) that Iraq is a failed and fractured state and that the objective of nation state actors is fundamentally defensive in preserving state structures, than we have a problem. 

If we are to see Iraq and other Fourth Generation conflicts as they are and not through the looking glass, we need to use words more carefully. Because there is no state in Iraq, there is also no government. Orders given in Baghdad have no meaning, because there are no state institutions to carry them out. The governmental positions of Iraqi leaders have no substance. Their power is a function of their relationship to various militias, not of their offices. (Mr. al-Maliki has no militia, which means he is a figurehead.) The Iraqi “army” and “police” are groupings of Shiite militias, which exist to fight other militias and which take orders from militia leaders, not the government. Government revenues are slush funds militia leaders use to pay their militiamen. All of these phenomena, and many more, are products of the one basic reality: there is no state.

If you believe that the Maliki government is fundamentally legitimate and accepted as such, then engaging the Mahdi Army is a legitimate and legitimating function of the government.  If, on the other had, the belief is that Maliki leads a large sectarian faction with fancy uniforms and foreign support, this is campaigning by high explosives.  In which case it is a de-legitimatizing function when  American counter-insurgency doctrine is built on the accumulation of popular support and legitimacy for the host government.   

Comments

[SteveIL]

I'm not sure there's a point in this post. If one believes that Iraq is a failed state now, then the point being made is that the U.S. shouldn't have gone into Iraq in 2003. But in order for that to be correct, then one has to assume Iraq was a functioning state prior to 2003, when it was led by Saddam Hussein. That is the great fallacy being perpetuated by the "liberals". Iraq under Hussein was already a failed state, except one that supported Islamist terrorism, and had ties to Al Qaeda. Just prior to the invasion, enough UN Security Council member nations were pushing to get Iraq from out of the sanctions they'd been under; had that happened, Hussein would have had no problem further helping Al Qaeda (and bin Laden). I think the rest of the U.S. and the world, except for the leftist "liberals", have gone way beyond the "we shouldn't have gone into Iraq in the first place" meme.

Besides, this part in the linked piece is just wrong:

The failure of Mr. al-Maliki’s “big push” into Basra put Iraq’s statelessness on display.

That's already been debunked. Maliki and the Iraqis have succeeded greatly. The only ones who say otherwise are "John Birch" types and the Democrat "liberal" media.

[SteveIL]

Sorry about the double comment.

[fester]

Steve --- the point in the post is an identification of different thought processes and assumptions. I am trying to offer an explanation as to where the assumptions are coming from in order to promote further discussion with awareness of divergent assumptions.

Also, I'll take out your double post --- shit happens.

Fester

[Eric Martin]

Saddam had ties to al-Qaeda? He helped them?

Wow, and he's calling others John Birch types. Sheesh.

[1MaNLan]

I thought that your post was very useful, Fester. Whether or not Iraq is a "failed state" is a critical question for anyone trying understand what is going on there and what is likely to go on there in the future. There are those on the left and right that both agree and disagree on the failed state question. But, of course, the answer to the question does not, itself, impose an ideological litmus test... except to those enmeshed in their ideologies.

I happen to accept that Iraq is a failed state. I can not see either a Maliki or a Sadr (or any other faction or its representatives for that matter) filling the impossibly tall order of bringing security, stability, food, medical care, electricity, as well as uniting disparate factions across the Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurdish communities in common purpose, while limiting Iranian influence and kicking out the American occupiers, while also developing a representative national army fully equipped to defend its borders. At some future date, after a period of evolution, the conditions and context may change. But in Iraq, at this time, Ya just can't get there from here...

[SteveIL]

"

Steve --- the point in the post is an identification of different thought processes and assumptions. I am trying to offer an explanation as to where the assumptions are coming from in order to promote further discussion with awareness of divergent assumptions."

I don't know. Basing a discussion on an already debunked premise, "The failure of Mr. al-Maliki’s “big push” into Basra put Iraq’s statelessness on display.", kind of defeats the purpose of that discussion. But hey, go for it.

"Also, I'll take out your double post --- shit happens."

Thanks.

"Saddam had ties to al-Qaeda? He helped them?"

Yes. You have to read things other than only those from the so-called "reality-based community".

[fester]

Steve -- please cite sources as I believe you are full of shit on the Hussein-Al-Queada operational ties as the DoD, the intel community and pretty much anyone with any interest in proving that this is the case has come to the opposite conclusion. NB: Steven Hayes and Laurie Mylorie are instant red flags for your argument here.

[SteveIL]

Here is the report. It's from a misnamed post at ABC News called "Report Shows No Link Between Saddam and al Qaeda", because the report itself clearly shows there were links.

See? No Stephen Hayes, no Laurie Mylorie.

Needless to say, I already know how "liberals" have spun this report and will continue to spin this. The fact remains that there were ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Just because they weren't wrapped up in neat little packages doesn't mean they didn't exist. In fact, it would have behooved Saddam to keep his relationship with Al Qaeda quiet since he had to have known he would have been a target much sooner than he ended up being. As the report states near the end, there are still tons and tons of documents that have yet to be reviewed completely, and they very well may show more definitive info than what we've seen.

And by the way, maybe you should read Stephen Hayes more often. His reporting on all this has been spot on.

[Eric Martin]

So Steve,

How did Saddam help al-Qaeda?

[Eric Martin]

I just read the report, and they didn't cite examples of Saddam helping al-Qaeda. Or even meaningful ties to al-Qaeda.

The best I saw was certain degrees of separation - many of them tenuous, exaggerated and categorically false.

For example, citing Egyptian Jihad as a Qaeda offshoot is odd because Zawahiri left that group because it would not embrace a Qaeda type outlook. That's why he left in the first place!

Anyway, if you have any solid counterexamples, I welcome them.

[SteveIL]

As I said earlier:

Needless to say, I already know how "liberals" have spun this report and will continue to spin this.

Keep spinning, Eric.

[Eric Martin]

Spin?

I'm speaking particulars. Do you want to engage particulars? No spin, facts. Facts good. Spin bad.