Condi Empty-Handed From Arab Meet On Iraq

By Cernig

Condi Rice came away from a meeting of Arab states over Iraq yesterday with none of her hoped-for gains or concessions. Iraq's Arab neighbours refused to commit to forgiving Iraqi debt and were just as noncommital about opening embassies in Baghdad - something which would give the Iraqi Shiite-dominated state far greater legitimacy among its own Sunni populace.

The Reuters report on the meeting was compiled, it seems, on Rice's plane and is full of US official attempts to spin the meeting as hopeful. However, Arab nations have stuck to their view that Iraq has billions in oil income now (much of it squirrelled away in US banks) along with some of the largest reserves of oil in the region and should pay its debts - even those from the Saddam era.

Likewise, Iraq's Sunni neighbours believe that the current Dawa/ISCI coalition in power in Iraq is not only too beholden to Iran but also promotes a virulently Persian-centric and supremacist view of Islamic culture which sees Arab identity as being subordinate to religious identity. They balk at giving that coalition legitimacy when they believe that it will repress their Sunni co-religionists in Iraq to the limits of US tolerance for that repression...and further once the US leaves. Not to mention, they see the ISCI's stated position of creating a massive eight-province autonomous region in Iraq's oil-rich South as a gift to Iran which will destabilize the entire regional balance of power.

Although there are many groups in Iraq — Shiite and Sunni, Turkmen and Kurd — it is a majority Shiite country and in the end the geopolitical calculus of the United States and Iran has to do with what kind of Shiite government they want in control here.

The party that both Iran and the United States are backing, the Islamic Supreme Iraqi Council, a bitter rival of al-Sadr's movement, has managed to play to the interests of both countries. Under Iraq's constitution, provinces can form regions with considerable independence from Baghdad. The Supreme Council advocates a large, semi-autonomous region in the south, similar to Kurdistan in the north, comprising the nine southern provinces. And because many of the council's leaders lived in exile in Iran during the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iran has political ties to the group.

Coupled with Iran's shared Shiite heritage, the prospect of such a region would amplify Iran's influence over the oil-rich area.

Unlike the Iran and the U.S., Arab interests are better served if the kind of Shiite in control of Iraq is nationalist (Sadr) rather than separatist (Badr).

What Reuters doesn't report, though, is another remarkable bit of wrong-headedness from America's top diplomat. Middle East Online reports:

Rice sought to persuade her counterparts from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as those of Egypt and Jordan, that Iraq's Shiite leadership was now fighting for national interests, rather than sectarian ones, after it took on Shiite militias allegedly armed by Iran.

"I think adjustments are going to have to be made in the way Iraq's neighbours think about it," Rice said in Baghdad on Sunday, claiming that the Shiite-led government in Baghdad was now behaving in "a non-sectarian fashion." [Emphasis Mine - C]

One has to wonder if Rice actually believes this blatant falsehood - but it's certain that Arab nations, who all maintain intelligence and familial ties with Iraq's Sunni population - don't believe it. There are plenty of reports of sectarian bias inside Maliki's government still - Awakening members can't get into the police or army in numbers but Maliki can find room for 10,000 Badrists, government aid goes overwhelmingly to Shiite areas and some Awakening groups even went on strike recently over Shiite security force bias in their area. Certainly affairs are better than they were a year ago - death squad attacks are radically down and many of the worst sectarian offenders have been purged from ministries - but absolutely no-one in the region believes that any improvements were purely Maliki's rather than forced from his government by US pressure. And few believe that those improvements will remain in place once US pressure is removed as it eventually must be.

That Rice decided to tell Arab leaders such a remarkable falsehood, when they all know better, cannot have gone down well.

Update Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark (who actually reads Arabic and has been following Arabic opinion on the matter):

I don't think many Arab leaders or pundits believe that Maliki could or would make such a move, making it a nice fallback position for them. I can't find many Arab commentators convinced by the notion of Maliki being part of any anti-Iranian coalition or by Rice's (or Maliki's) arguments that Basra showed he had changed his sectarian spots or given up his sectarian ways (nor am I sure why they should be, but that's a different question).  It would probably take an awful lot to change their views at this point (I don't think that bringing the Accordance Front back into the government would suffice, though it would probably help with some of them - things are just much deeper than shuffling the cabinet).  As for Iran, Gulf leaders and publics have been skeptical about a confrontation for a while now, certainly not favorable towards Iran but inclined towards accommodation rather than conflict, and it's not clear what would have changed their minds. 

Comments

[Ron Beasley]

This is not a surprise. The rest of the world is unlikely to take anything from the Bush administration seriously and even less likely to pay any attention to the incompetent and untruthful Dr Rice.

[SteveIL]

"I think adjustments are going to have to be made in the way Iraq's neighbours think about it," Rice said in Baghdad on Sunday, claiming that the Shiite-led government in Baghdad was now behaving in "a non-sectarian fashion." [Emphasis Mine - C]

One has to wonder if Rice actually believes this blatant falsehood -...

I've been scanning your posts on this. First off, how in the world can you call what Rice said was false? Second, did you realize just about everyone of your recent posts on this whole Basra/Baghdad/Sadr thing has been, oh, wrong? That includes this gem:

Unlike the Iran and the U.S., Arab interests are better served if the kind of Shiite in control of Iraq is nationalist (Sadr) rather than separatist (Badr).

You do know that Sadr is pretty well believed to be in Iran, taking orders from the oh so wonderful Iranian government. So saying that Sadr is more of a "nationalist" falls on its face.

By the way, there's one aspect that is missing; the "Sunnis" and "Shias" is really a misnomer. We are talking about Sunni and Shia Arabs; anyone with a clue knows the Iranian government is not one run by Arabs. Kurds and Turkmen are primarily Sunni, but there is no love lost between these groups and their Sunni Arab counterparts; same between the Shia Arabs in Iraq and the Shia Persians in Iran. So there's no guarantee that Iran will have that great an influence under Maliki as they probably would with a more powerful Sadr.

Now, as far as what Reuters says, take with a grain of salt; it probably isn't close to what really went on.

[Steve Hynd]

Steve, you're back! The same thing goes as for The Donald - behave yourself this time.

I can call what Rice said false because it is - and the Arab nations know it.

Sadr is supposed to be Iran, yes -- studying. Go research the origins of the ISCI and Badr Brigade if you honestly think they're less beholden to Iran...or read this from the National Council of Resistance for Iran.

You do know that the Badr Brigade, the ISCI militia, was established by the Qods Force and fought for Iran against Iraq, don't you? And that Maliki and Hakim spent their exile in Iran?

Regards, C

[1MaNLan]

"That Rice decided to tell Arab leaders such a remarkable falsehood, when they all know better, cannot have gone down well."

You said it, brother.

To me, Condis performance as herself was moody and dim. but this time, none of her material came close the the high, high notes of her celebrated "birth pangs of democracy" period.

Between you and me, tickets to SOS CONDI! are not selling like they used to. Could be the act has gone stale. Plus, who can afford them anymore?

[SteveIL]

Oh I think there's way more going on here than the sources you cite are presenting, and that it's much better for the U.S. than what is stated by the media, whether they be American, European, or Arab.

By the way, that piece from Dar Al Hayat is quite old and irrelevant, since the effects of the surge weren't yet in place. There's no way Maliki's recent actions against Sadr could have occurred without its success.

Second, I wouldn't doubt there are some ties between the various Shiite groups and Iran (the countries have been side-by-side neighbors since Iraq became independent), and the new government of Iraq will have to deal with Iran because of that (as did Saddam; he just handled it badly by invading Iran). But Sadr's thugs have been on the receiving end of much of that Iranian support, compared to that of the others. Plus, those other Iraqi Shiite parties seem to be more willing to work within the Iraqi framework than being subservient to Iran. That includes the Badr Brigade. That's the difference between Sadr and all these other groups.

[SteveIL]

Lastly (and OT), congrats on the new look. I like it.

[Steve Hynd]

Hi Steve,

The Dar Al Hayat piece is from this month. Another snippet from it:
"Iran's support for al-Hakim and Sadr, prior to and after the war, eventually had to reach the point of making preferences, especially at such a critical period. The upcoming provincial council elections will determine the future of Southern Iraq and the relationship of the periphery to the central authority. It is in Iran's interest for al-Hakim to wield influence in this region which borders Iran. However, if the Mahdi Army wins the elections, which is highly probable, and continues to maintain its position unchanged, Iran will lose its long-term bet on a weak and divided Iraq. Moreover, even if al-Sadr himself supported federalism, his Movement would suffer divisions as it is constituted of diverse groups, some with Arabist and others with Islamist orientations. Consequently, this explains the repeated official and American announcements that al-Sadr is not personally targeted and that all he needs to do is to lift the political cover off al-Mahdi Army and become involved in the political process."

You say "But Sadr's thugs have been on the receiving end of much of that Iranian support, compared to that of the others." Do you have any evidence for that, as the primary Iranian opposition group obviously disagrees with your claim and says it has documented proof of Badr Brigade perfidy on Iran's behalf while integrated into the Iraqi government. Of course the Badr Brigade are happy to work within the system. They are the system.

Regards, C

OT, glad you like the new design.

[SteveIL]

The Dar Al Hayat piece is from this month.

My apologies, you are correct. What I was referring to as old news was regarding the Biden proposal, which was an amendment of an amendment of the Defense Appropriations bill, and is completely non-binding. I don't see a tie between that, and the rest of what Mr. Zein purports, that the Shiite Arabs, and SCIRI in particular, are actively seeking to partition Iraq. With Turkey and Iran as neighbors, I'm thinking all sides believe it's better to stay together in an Iraqi federation.

You say "But Sadr's thugs have been on the receiving end of much of that Iranian support, compared to that of the others." Do you have any evidence for that, as the primary Iranian opposition group obviously disagrees with your claim and says it has documented proof of Badr Brigade perfidy on Iran's behalf while integrated into the Iraqi government.

Yes, as a matter of fact, from the Dar al Hayat piece:

Iran's support for al-Hakim and Sadr, prior to and after the war, eventually had to reach the point of making preferences, especially at such a critical period.

It was only recently that the Iranian government finally decided to back up Maliki and the Iraqi government, although I believe some elements of the IRGC and Al Qods are still backing Sadr. Like I said earlier, it doesn't seem that Sadr is in Iraq, nor has been for a long time; and he's probably (as has been reported) in Tehran. I don't think he would be able to live there all this time without having some backing somewhere in the Iranian government, and quite a large one at that. I would imagine that his support from the Iranians is now on the wane, however, but not enough to get him kicked out or arrested.

Anyway, I find this interesting. Not long before Maliki's move on Sadr, the Iraqis met with both the Iranian government in Tehran, and with VP Cheney (in Iraq on a visit). After that, Maliki did what he did, and very successfully I might add. Like I said, there's a lot going on behind the scenes that point to a very different view of how things are than what any reporter or editor is portraying, even from London-based Arab periodicals.

Of course the Badr Brigade are happy to work within the system. They are the system.

So? What's the problem with that? With everything I've seen over the last several years, it looks like Sadr has been the one who has been pro-Islamic (Shiite) with serious ties to Iran, much more than the Badr group. After all, the Iranian government is still pushing the idea that there is still an "Islamic Revolution" going on in Iran (kind of like the decrepit Castro has done in Cuba, to "justify" all the garbage he did); this is exactly what Sadr has been trying to do in Iraq (starting a revolution), and is now on the losing end.